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NOTES
THE CORPORATION AS A PARTNER
For many years the courts have stated that a corporation does not
have the implied power to enter into a partnership agreement ;1 the
power must be expressly given either by statutory2 or charter 3 pro-
vision. The purpose of this note is to determine the legal significance
of this statement by analyzing the judicial treatment of corporations
entering into partnership agreements without the express power to do
80.
The power of a corporation to enter into a partnership has been
:treated differently by the courts from other corporate powers. Gen-
erally, all corporate powers emanate from state incorporation laws.
These laws, in addition to designating the general powers which all
corporations are to have, give each corporation all of the powers neces-
sary to carry out corporate objectives. These powers may be explicitly
designated in the corporation charter or they may be implied from
corporate purposes.' The courts, however, in treating the power to
form a partnership differently from other corporate powers, have
said that this power cannot be implied from corporate purposes; there-
fore, any contract of partnership, or agreement entered into pursuant
to a contract of partnership, which is not expressly authorized by a
statute or the corporate charter, has been said to be ultra vires and
unenforceable' s
The basic objection to implying such a power has been that in a typi-
1. Whittenton Mills v. Upton, 76 Mass. (10 Gray) 582 (1858)' Mallory v.
Hananer Oil Works, 86 Tenn. 598, 8 S.W. 396 (1888) ; BALLANTINE, dORPORATIONS§ 87 (Rev. ed. 1946); 6 FLETCHER, CORPORATIONS § 2520 (Rev. ed. 1950).
2. At least two states by statute have included in the general powers given to
a corporation the power to become a partner. ILL. ANN. STAT. tit. 32 § 157.5(G)(1954); Mo. Rsv. STAT. §-351.385 (1949). Section 2 of the Uniform Partnership
Act includes corporations in its definition of persons capable of becoming part-
ners. Research has indicated that few courts have specifically passed upon the
effect of this section of the Act and have continued to state that a corporation
cannot enter into a partnership where there is no provision for such an exercise
of power in the charter. One state has interpretedthe inclusion of corporations
in the definition of persons capable of entering into a partnership as giving the
corporation the power to do so. Memphis Npt. Gas Co. v. Pope, 178 Tenn. 580,
161 S.W.2d 211 (1941) (alternative holding), aff'd sub nom. Memphis Nat. Gas
Co. v. Beeler, 315 U.S. 649 (1942).
3. See News-Register Co. v. Rockingham Publishing Co., 118 Va. 140, 86 S.E.
874 (1915). Where the issue has arisen on demurrer, some courts have said that
it will be presumed that, in the absence of an allegation, the corporate charter
expressly confers the power to become a partner. Universal Pictures Corp. v.
Roy Davidge Film Laboratory, Ltd., 7 Cal. App. 2d 366, 45 P.2d 1028 (1935);
Morgan v. Child, Cole & Co., 61 Utah 448, 213 Pac. 177 (1923).
4. See BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS § 53 et seq. (Rev. ed. 1946) for a more
detailed discussion of the creation of pQwers in a particular corporation by its
charter provisions.
5. See note I supra.
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cal partnership any partner has equal power to bind the others, and
entry into a partnership would, in effect, yield corporate management
to persons who are not within the corporate structure. This would
defeat a basic principle of corporation law that management of a cor-
poration should be vested in the board of directors and agents author-
ized by the board.'
The statement that a corporation has no implied power to become a
partner, and the reason behind this assertion, have been attacked.7 It
has been argued that even if a corporation joins in a partnership
agreement with an individual, still, that individual's power to bind the
corporation differs to no appreciable extent from the power of a cor-
porate agent to bind the corporation.' This argument postulates that
a corporation can act only through human agents,' and, since a cor-
poration can make a contract with an individual giving him manage-
rial control, so also, a corporation should be allowed to make a part-
nership contract giving the other partner equal control over the man-
agement of the partnership. In both instances, it is argued, the same
amount of control would be delegated; in fact, partners generally ex-
ercise joint control while a corporate agent may have what is tanta-
mount to complete control in the management of the corporate busi-
ness. Also, both a contract of partnership and an employment contract
can usually be dissolved at any time.-
The position that there is no logical distinction between a corporate
agent and a corporate partner has not been accepted by the courts;
they have continued to adhere to the position that the power of a
corporation to be a partner cannot be implied from the corporate
purposes.1 Judicial decisions reflect implicit dissatisfaction with this
6. See, e.g., Gunn v. Central R.R., 74 Ga. 509 (1885); Whittenton Mills v.
Upton, 76 Mass. (10 Gray) 582 (1858); Mallory v. Hananer Oil Works, 86 Tenn.
598, 8 S.W. 396 (1888). Cf. Page-Dressier Co. v. Meader, 118 Ore. 359, 244 Pac.
308 (1926). BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS § 87 (Rev. ed. 1946).
7. Rowley, The Corporate Partner, 14 MINN. L. REv. 769 (1930).
8. Id. at 772.
9. Id. at 771.
10. In either situation, of course, the breaching party may be liable for damages.
Unlike the normal agent, however, in the absence of an agreement as to control,
each partner has an equal voice in the management of the business. If there are
two partners, an individual and a corporation, neither party could determine the
policy without the other's acquiescence. MECHEM, ELEMENTS OF PARTNERSHIP
§ 282 (2d ed. 1920). In a corporation the majority of thi members of the board
of directors determine policy; thus, theoretically, no one member of the corpora-
tion board would have the amount of power that a partner would have. The
partnership, therefore, does create at least some distortion of the normal cor-
porate structure. In People v. North River Sugar Refining Co., 121 N.Y. 582,
625, 24 N.E. 834, 840 (1890), the court said:
As corporate grants are always assumed to have been made for the public
benefit, any conduct which destroys their normal functions, and maims and
cripples their separate activity, and takes away their free and independent
action, must so far disappoint the purpose of their creation as to affect un-
favorably the public interest...
11. See note 1 supra.
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position, however, and the courts have found several methods of evad-
ing it.
One method the courts have used has been to apply generally recog-
nized limitations to the ultra vires doctrine which negates corporate
liability for acts done outside the scope of its authorized business.
While these limitations vary in different jurisdictions, a large major-
ity of the courts will enforce an ultra vires contract executed by both
sides,12 and many courts will enforce an ultra vires contract performed
by the complaining party.23 Thus, if a partnership contract has been
executed on both sides, it has been held that one partner may maintain
an action for an accounting against the other.1 Also, the courts have
entertained an action on a contract brought by a creditor against a
corporation in pursuance of a partnership agreement when the cred-
itor has performed his part of the bargain.25 The confusion which
exists in regard to the ultra vires doctrine itself and the various inter-
pretations given it by different jurisdictions, however, limit the appli-
cability of this device to avoid the general rule that a corporation can-
not become a partner. 6
The method most commonly used by the courts to circumvent the
rule prohtibiting the recognition of an implied power of a corporation
to become a partner has been to classify an agreement as one for a
joint enterprise rather than for a partnership. Although the courts
have said that there is no implied power to enter into a partnership
contract, they have found an implied power of a corporation to enter
into a joint adventure." A joint adventure may be generally defined
as a special and limited association of two or more legal entities for
the purpose of carrying out a single enterprise which can be accom-
plished within a limited period of time."a A contract of partnership,
on the other hand, has been considered by the courts a more general
type of agreement intended to endure for a relatively long. period of
time and in -which a series of transactions is contemplated.19 Once the
12. 7 FLETCHnE, CoRPoRATiONs § 3497 (1931).
13. 7 FLETCHER, CORPORATIONS § 3473 (1931). Some jurisdictions permit an
action in quasi-contract. Id. § 3470, § 3471.
14. Rankin v. Emigh, 218 U.S. 27 (1910); Mervyn Inv. Co. v. Biber, 184 Cal.
637, 194 Pac. 1037 (-1921) ; J. P. Barnett Co. v. Ludeau, 171 La. 121, 129 So. 655
(1930). Cf. Page-Dressier Co. v. Meader, 118 Ore. 359, 244 Pac. 308 (1926).
15. Hayes-Thomas Grain Co. v. Wilcox Corp., 144 Ark. 621 223 S.W. 357
(1920); Cleveland Paper Co. v. Courier, 67 Mich. 152, 34 N.W. 556 (1887);
Catskill Bank v. Gray, 14 Barb. (N.Y.) 471 (1851).
16. See 7 FLETCHER, CORPORATIONS § 3411 (1931).
17. Central Lumber Co. v. Schilleci, 227 Ala. 29, 148 So. 614 (1933); Clement
A. Evans & Co. v. Waggoner, 30 S.E.2d 915 (Ga. 1944); Nolan v. J. & M. Doyle
Co., 338 Pa. 398, 13 A.2d 59 (1940).
18. Kasishke v. Baker, 146 F.2d 113 (10th Cir. 1944); MFCHEM, ELEMENTS OF
THE LAW OF PARTNERSHIP § 16 (2d ed. 1920); Mechem, The Law of Joint Ad-
ventures, 15 MINx. L. RE,. 644, 658 (1931).
19. See Mechem, The Law of Joint Adventures, 15 MINN. L. REv. 644, 657
(1931), where the underlying reason for the courts' distinction between partner-
ship and joint adventure is suggested:
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court labels an agreement a joint adventure, however, the corporate
joint adventurer is governed by the same legal rules of liability that
govern partners.2"
A study of the cases in which the distinction between joint adven-
tures and partnerships has been drawn reveals that the courts, in an
attempt to give effect to an agreement, have given such a broad inter-
pretation to the joint adventure definition that it would be impossible
to predict with any reasonable degree of certainty whether any partic-
ular agreement is a partnership or a joint adventure.2 1 For example,
"A partnership involves the conception of a business-an entity, in a mer-
cantile sense at least, separate and distinct from the individual affairs of the
members. Such an entity cannot be created by the doing of a single act. It
is the performance of a series of acts, all done for the same ultimate purpose
of profit under the joint agreement so as to be bound together into a unit,
that underlies the conception in the minds of mercantile men of an entity
quite distinct from their individual affairs; and this entity the law recognizes
to a certain extent and to it attaches certain incidents. But if the joint
agreement is such that it does not contemplate the creation of such an entity
there is no need of turning to the complex law of partnership for a guide,
but each Rroblem arising thereunder can be solved by the ordinary law of
contracts.
The controlling thought in this analysis is that the concept of partnership
has gradually been refined and developed to a point where it is concerned
only with an association engaged in business involving continuity-a con-
tinuing enterprise-whereas joint adventure is an association which does not
have for its purpose the carrying on of a business in the sense of a continuing
enterprise.
Mechem then concluded that the distinction, in fact, was not valid since the courts
have not only applied the legal results of partnerships to joint adventures, but
have also found joint adventures in cases where there was in fact a partnership
in the sense of a continuing business. Id. at 659.
20. Fechteler v. Palm Bros. & Co., 133 Fed. 462 (6th Cir. 1904); Central Lum-
ber Co. v. Schilleci, 227 Ala. 29, 148 So. 614 (1933); Milton Kaufman Inc. v.
Superior Court, 94 Cal. App. 2d 8, 210 P.2d 83 (1949); Mechem, Law of Joint Ad-
ventures, 15 MINN. L. Rzv. 644, 654 (1931).
21. See, e.g., Central Lumber Co. v. Schilleci, 227 Ala. 29, 148 So. 614 (1933);
Nolan v. Doyle, 338 Pa. 398, 13 A.2d 59 (1940); Whatley v. Cato Oil Co., 115
S.W.2d 1205 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938). In many of the cases holding agreements to
have created joint adventures rather than partnerships, the business activities
were very general in nature. The finding on this issue alone would appear to be
inconsistent with the idea of a single venture; however, these cases were com-
plicated by the fact that the contracts had been partly executed and the parties
suing were either creditors or partners asking for an accounting of the profits
from the transaction. The equities represented in the claims of these two classes
of complainants might very well influence a court in finding a joint adventure.
In many jurisdictions the determination as to whether an enterprise is a partner-
ship rather than a joint adventure is unnecessary since liability could be imposed
on the basis of the exceptions to the ultra vires rule. See text supported by notes
12-16 supra.
Cases involving creditors where joint adventures were found include: Luhrig
Collieries Co. v. Interstate Coal & Dock Co., 281 Fed. 265 (S.D.N.Y. 1922);
Becker v. Turpin, 61 CaL App. 16, 214 Pac. 255 (1923); Hobart-Lee Tie Co. v.
Grodsky, 329 Mo. 706, 46 S.V .2d 859 (1931); Lane v. National Insurance Agency,
148 Ore. 589, 37 P.2d 365 (1934); Wyoming-Indiana Oil & Gas Co. v. Weston,
43 Wyo. 526, 7 P.2d 206 (1932). Partnership suits for accounting of profits
where joint adventures were found include: Kasishke v. Baker, 146 F.2d 113
(10th Cir. 1944); Clement A. Evans & Co. v. Waggoner, 30 S.E.2d 915 (Ga.
1944); Forina Co. v. Karnheim, 240 Mass. 574, 134 N.E. 605 (1922). The will-
ingness of courts to "find" joint ventures has led Professor Mechem, in The Law
of Jnt Adventures, 15 MINN. L. Rnv. 644, 653 (1931), to say:
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1955/iss1/8
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
suppose A corporation, a construction company, desires to do some
construction work for X but has insufficient capital to finance the job.
A corporation approaches B, an individual, who has adequate capital
but no possibility of acquiring the contract although B also is in the
construction business. A corporation and B enter into an agreement
whereby, in return for a share in the profits, B is to furnish capital to
finance the construction, provide a performance bond, and furnish
money necessary to maintain the equipment to be utilized. A corpora-
tion is to perform the construction work, and other stipulations con-
template joint management of the job which is to last for a limited
length of time. In such a situation, is the agreement between A cor-
poration and B a joint adventure or a partnership? In two cases in
which substantially these same facts were involved, one court called
the agreement a joint adventure22 while another called it a partner-
ship.2 3 The court which called the contract a partnership, however,
did enforce the agreement on the ground that it had been executed by
both sides.2 4
The courts have also held that, even if there is a partnership agree-
ment by the corporation, the rationale of the general judicial refusal
to imply the power to enter into such an understanding is not applica-
ble if the corporation retains control of the activities of the partner-
ship and the other partner merely contributes capital s They justify
their position by saying that the rule was developed to avoid a delega-
tion of management to persons outside the corporate structure and
that this possibility is eliminated if the corporation retains managerial
control. These courts have not discussed the fact that this possibility
is not completely eliminated; according to strict partnership law, a
corporation should be held liable to a bona fide third party who enters
into a contract in reliance on the apparent authority of an individual
partner, even though such partner owes a duty to the corporation not
to enter into such a contract.26 The decisions in this area show, how-
ever, that the courts do not believe that all types of partnership con-
It is submitted that insofar as any of the cases may hold that a corporation
has the power and authority to engage in a joint adventure where it would
not be permitted to engage in a partnership, the true reason for such a
holding is a desire to escape in some way the stringency of the rule making
it ultra vires for corporations to engage in partnerships.
See Rowley, The Corporate Partner, 14 MINN. L. REy. 769, 776 (1930), where this
same view is expressed.
22. Nolan v. Doyle, 338 Pa. 398, 13 A .2d 59 (1940).
23. Hayes-Thomas Grain Co. v. Wilcox Corp., 144 Ark. 29, 223 S.W. 359
(1920).
24. Ibid.
25. Bates v. Coronado Beach, 109 Cal. 160, 41 Pac. 855 (1895); Rosenblum v.
Springfield Produce Brokerage Co., 243 Mass. 111, 137 N.E. 357 (1922); Munici-
pal Paving Co. v. Herring, 50 Okla. 470, 150 Pac. 1067 (1915); Allen & Sons v.
Woonsocket County, 11 R.I. 288 (1876).
26. MECHEM, ELEMENTS OF TIE LAW OF PARTNERSHIP § 244 (2d ed. 1920);
RowLEY, THE MODERN LAW OF PARTNERSHIP § 418 (1916).
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tracts should be denied enforcement; it is only when the agreement
delegates to the non-corporate partner managerial control that the
courts may feel that the contract is against the best interests of the
corporation.
The courts have made another inroad on the rule by excepting cases
in which a mining partnership is involved.27 A mining partnership
differs from the ordinary partnership in two significant respects: (1)
death or bankruptcy of one partner does not terminate a mining part-
nership while it does terminate an ordinary partnership, and (2) a
mining partner may substitute an assignee as a partner in the part-
nership without the consent of the other partners while this can-
not be done by an ordinary partner.2 8 In the mining as well as in
the general partnership, however, one partner is able to bind the
other in respect to contracts made in the name of the partnership.
Thus, the main criticism which has led the courts to prohibit corpora-
tions from becoming partners, i.e., loss of managerial control, has not
been eliminated in the case of the mining partnership agreement. The
nature of the business of mining is such that corporations have found
it strongly advantageous to enter into a partnership of this nature,
and it would seem, therefore, that the grace which has been granted to
mining corporations is based more on economic expediency than any
other factor.
Thus, the cases disclose that the courts have felt it necessary to
place restrictions on their position that there can be no implication of
the power of a corporation to enter into a partnership agreement. It
would appear that the rule arose in an effort to protect the stock-
holders of a corporation; however, there has been no need to apply the
rule in the cases in which it has been asserted. In all these cases, the
rule has been used as a defense either by the corporation when suit is
brought against it by a creditor or the other partner, or by a creditor
or partner when suit is brought by the corporation. In both situations,
the courts have held that neither the corporation nor the other party
to the action should be allowed to avoid a contract which has been
entered into voluntarily. Where the contract has been performed by
both sides, or at least by one side, the courts may enforce the contract
by applying the exceptions to the ultra vires doctrine. Moreover, even
if the contract is unperformed, by calling the partnership contract a
joint adventure, or a mining partnership, or by finding that the in-
dividual partner has no managerial control, the court may enforce the
agreement
27. Sturm v. Ulrich, 10 F.2d 9 (8th Cir. 1925). This case contains a large
compilation of cases which recognized the validity of mining partnerships and
other partnerships of that nature.
28. Ibid. For the law on these points in regard to an ordinary partnership,
see the UNIFoRM PARTNERSHIP AcT §§ 27-31 (1949).
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The willingness of the courts to find that the contract should be
enforced has, indirectly, given the corporation the implied power
to enter into a partnership agreement. It is submitted that the courts
should openly recognize this implied power and that a contract entered
into pursuant to such a power should be enforced. The rule to the con-
trary arose basically in an effort to protect shareholders; however,
their protection is adequate without a rule against the implication of
the power of a corporation to enter into-a contract of partnership.
Dissatisfied shareholders may bring an action for mismanagement
against the corporation and the corporate directors in which they may
seek to enjoin the performance of the contract.29 By adopting the posi-
tion that there is an implied power of a corporation to become a part-
ner, the courts would be doing nothing more than recognizing an
accomplished fact.30
LEO I. CoLowicK
29. Although, generally, actions for mismanagement will be enforced only if
there is a gross abuse of discretion, a gross abuse may be found more easily
-here'than in the ordinary mismanagement case, since the courts apparently
desire to construe strictly contracts which delegate control to parties outside the
corporate structure. See FLETcHER, CORPORATIONS § 5821 (1943), for a discus-
sion of the circumstances where a shareholder may enjoin the directors. It is sub-
mitted that the following factors should be considered in determining whether
the corporate management -has abused its discretionary powers. First, how much
control over the corporate purpose has been given to the other partner or part-
ners? See text supported by notes 25, 26 supra. Where complete managerial
control is vested in the corporate partner, courts have held that a partnership is
permissible even though all of the other attributes of a partnership are present.
Even if there is less than complete control by the corporation, however, the cor-
poration should still be allowed to enter into a partnership agreement in the
absence of a gross abuse of discretioo by the corporate directors. Second, what
is the nature of the corporate business? The mining business (see text supported
by note 27 supra) is an example of a business where the economic need for a
partnership has been strong enough to cause the court to enforce the agreement.
Third, how much financial responsibility and business acumen do the other part-
ners possess? Fourth, are the directors of the corporation in good faith? Upon
consideration of these and any other factors it may consider pertinent the court
should then decide whether the contract is so disadvantageous to the shareholders
that it should be enjoined.
30. In so far as the cases analyzed by the author reveal, most courts are en-
forcing corporate agreements by adopting the exceptions to the rule.
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